) have estimated probabilities for the occurrence of large aftershocks in varying time intervals after a mainshock in California. These probabilities were calculated from a proposed "generic California" model of aftershock occurrence. The model has four parameters (a, b, c, and p), which are determined from an average of 62 previous aftershock sequences that had occurred throughout California from 1933 through 1987. Their plan is to use the a priori generic model as an initial estimate for any aftershock sequence, but then to update the model parameters (and the probabilities) as realtime data about the frequency and magnitudes of the aftershocks become available. In their report, however, tables are provided for the probabilities ofhazardous aftershocks that are based on either the a priori estimates of the generic model (1, table 1) or on the final a posteriori values from an aftershock sequence (1, table 2); thus the utility of the update scheme is not clearly demonstrated. Moreover, because of inherent uncertainties probability estimates based on the generic model alone (1, table 1) are suspect.
. S California Aftershock Model Uncertainties P. A. Reasenberg and L. M. Jones (1) have estimated probabilities for the occurrence of large aftershocks in varying time intervals after a mainshock in California. These probabilities were calculated from a proposed "generic California" model of aftershock occurrence. The model has four parameters (a, b, c, and p), which are determined from an average of 62 previous aftershock sequences that had occurred throughout California from 1933 through 1987. Their plan is to use the a priori generic model as an initial estimate for any aftershock sequence, but then to update the model parameters (and the probabilities) as realtime data about the frequency and magnitudes of the aftershocks become available. In their report, however, tables are provided for the probabilities ofhazardous aftershocks that are based on either the a priori estimates of the generic model (1, The deviations in the parameters of the generic model (SD's of 18 to 33%) are seen in the histograms in figure 2 of their report. (The histograms contain about 45% more data values than the quoted 62 aftershock sequences.) Here, chi-squared tests were applied to the histograms of the a and p parameters, with the result that the null hypothesis of Gaussian distributions can be rejected at the P = 0.05 significance level (Xa = 40.8, P = 0.024; Xp = 32.7, P = 0.036). In fact, the values in the histogram of the a parameter spanning nearly +2 SD of the mean, produce a chi-squared statistic (X2 = 28.2, P = 0.059) that does not formally reject the null hypothesis of a uniform distribution (5% significance level). The large uncertainties in these parameters can be shown to have a large effect on the estimated probabilities.
For example, consider estimating the probability of a large aftershock (M 2 5.5) in the 24 hours immediately after a M = 6.5 mainshock in California. This would seem to be the time of the most value of the generic model, since Reasenberg and Jones have found that after about a day the model parameters are weighed more heavily by the real-time data from the aftershock sequence itself than by the a priori generic estimates.
Allowing ± 1 SD in the two parameters that tested non-Gaussian (a and p), their equation 4 results in a spread of the estimated probability from 4 to 88%, compared with the 23.4% they tabulated from the median values of the generic model.
As another example, consider the probability of a large aftershock in the time interval 3 to 30 days after a mainshock. Uncertainties of ± 1 SD again in both a and p produce a spread of from 2 to 81%, compared with the tabulated value of 15.2%. According to Reasenberg and Jones, however, in this example the first 3 days of data after the mainshock can be used to update the parameters. This would presumably reduce the variance and thus decrease the spread in the above probability in accordance with the general scheme of going from table 1 to table 2 with real-time data. But in their report, no quantitative amount of variance reduction is given; thus no evaluation can be made of the reliability of the proposed update scheme in estimating probabilities for aftershocks.
In view of probable non-Gaussian statistics, the means of including the a priori generic averages into the update scheme is not readily apparent. In equation 5, Reasenberg and Jones suggest using a form of Bayes rule that assumes Gaussian statistics; this does not appear to be justified, and I believe alternative formulations or methods must be considered. A related question in non-Gaussian statistics is how close the mean value is to the most probable value of the data. As a worst-case illustration, consider rolling a die, that is, samples from a uniform distribution. An estimate, to any desired accuracy, of the mean value of the underlying stochastic process can be obtained by repeated rolls of the die. A histogram of the rolls provides constraints on the possible outcome of any roll of the die. But the next roll is unpredictable with any a priori model of the data. This illustration pertains to a discrete, limited process and obviously does not represent a continuous physical system, but the message is clear. In the aftershock model the a parameter is a measure of the production of aftershocks. The California average of a may therefore not be the best estimate (that is, the most probable) for describing aftershocks occurring in different tectonic settings ofthe state. Estimating model parameters from subsets ofthe data which focus on regional tectonics may actually prove more useful.
In addition to a and p, the other parameters (b and c), introduce even more uncertainty into the model. Therefore, the a priori generic model by itself appears to be unreliable in estimating probabilities of aftershocks because of poor constraints on some model parameters. Before the availability of real-time data, the generic model may have value as a predictive tool, but only in the broadest sense of assessing best-or worstcase scenarios for possible damaging aftershocks. To use it beyond its known time limitations, however, and without stating the important uncertainties, as in Response: Rydelek criticizes our approach (1) to modeling the post-mainshock earthquake hazard, citing the existence of large uncertainty in the generic model results and alleging the unsuitability of our application of Bayes rule for the estimation ofprobabilities at times after the mainshock. His comments question the overall utility of our model for hazard assessment, and his main point concerns the uncertainty in the probabilities for earthquakes estimated for the generic model.
We first correct a mistake and amend terminology in our original report. Rydelek notes that the number ofobservations in our original figure 2 exceeds the stated number of earthquake sequences used in our formulation of the generic model. The stated number, 62, is correct, as are the parameter means, medians, and standard deviations. Unfortunately, the histograms shown in that figure were incorrect and do not represent those 62 sequences. The correct histograms are shown in Fig. 1 . This error does not affect the results we originally reported.
We have refered to our probability estimates as Bayesian because they have the form of the posterior mean in the case that both the prior and sampling distributions are Gaussian. The relevant probability distributions are not Gaussian, so our estimates do not derive formally from Bayes rules. We will therefore refer to them here as the Reasenberg 
